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Models of interest group politics can help public health professionals (PHPs) to identify potential allies and
establish mechanisms of sustainable political influence. This article focusses on a particular model, known as
the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), and its explanations of coalition behaviour, the role of scientific infor-
mation and the ways in which coalitions can bring about policy change. The analysis illustrates the relevance of the
ACF for public health by drawing on examples from the recent policy debate on direct-to-consumer advertising of
prescription drugs (DTCA-PD) in the European Union (EU). It explores the strengths and weaknesses of the ACF in
explaining why ‘control’ of particular governmental units was key to the anti-DTCA coalition success, how the
evidence base was used strategically and why the pro-DTCA coalition ultimately failed in bringing about major
policy change. The article aims to equip PHPs with a tool which can be used to understand and engage with the
policy process. Moreover, in offering a more nuanced view of this process, a case is made for moving beyond
traditional, linear conceptions of the policy process and engaging in further research which uses political science
concepts to inform the study and practice of public health. The article concludes with a set of recommendations
for practitioners and researchers, emphasizing the value of political science for the former and the need for the
latter to reflect on the accessibility of policy studies for PHPs.
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Introduction
An understanding of interest groups and the coalitions that theyform is vital to successful engagement in health policy processes.
Models of interest group politics can help public health professionals
(PHPs) to identify potential allies and establish mechanisms of sus-
tainable political influence. This article focusses on a particular
model, known as the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), and
its explanations of coalition behaviour, the role of scientific infor-
mation and the ways in which coalitions can bring about policy
change. The analysis illustrates the relevance of the ACF for public
health by drawing on examples from the recent policy debate on
direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs (DTCA-PD) in
the European Union (EU). The article aims to equip PHPs with a
tool which can be used to understand and engage with the policy
process. Moreover, in offering a more nuanced view of this process,
a case is made for moving beyond traditional, linear conceptions of
the policy process and engaging in further research which uses
political science concepts to inform the study and practice of
public health.
The ACF is a model designed to explain the behaviour of actors in
debates on contentious public policy issues.1 Whilst there are plenty of
others approaches which might be fruitfully used, the ACF is distinctive
in being ‘. . .the closest thing to a general theory of policymaking’ and
thus offering a comprehensive framework for thinking about political
engagement.2 It understands the core of the policy-making process to
be a competition between coalitions of actors with different belief
systems.2 This article takes three core parts of the ACF—coalitions,
belief systems and learning—and uses them to explain some of the
main features of the DTCA-PD debate, before drawing some broader
conclusions for political engagement by PHPs. The first section
introduces the concept of coalitions and uses this to explain the
range of actors involved in DTCA-PD policy-making and the
importance of the relocation of responsibility for pharmaceutical
policy within the European Commission in 2009. The second section
discusses belief systems and how they shape the use of scientific infor-
mation, illustrating how research was used to put DTCA-PD on the
agenda and to maintain its salience. The third section explains the role
of learning in facilitating policy change and analyzes the failure of the
pro-DTCA-PD coalition to lift the ban on DTCA-PD, as well as the
potential for a shift in EU regulation in future. The conclusion identifies
implications for PHPs seeking to engage in health policy processes and
presents recommendations for both practitioners and researchers.
The article draws on the author’s previous research on the DTCA-
PD case.3 This research used documentary analysis, conducted while
the author was resident at a non-governmental organization (NGO)
closely involved in the development of the policy, as well as a review
of the academic literature, to study the formulation of DTCA-PD
policy. In the current article, this original data is analyzed alongside
a review of the ACF literature. At specific points, reference is made
to other literatures on, for instance, policy networks or the use of
evidence in policy-making, though space precludes an in-depth
review of all associated bodies of research.
The article illustrates the main tenets of the ACF using the case of
DTCA-PD in the EU. From 2001 until 2011, a coalition of actors led
by the pharmaceutical industry was engaged in a campaign to repeal
(and later amend) the EU ban on DTCA-PD, so as to permit
companies to provide information about their medicines directly
to patients. The benefits of this, the pro-DTCA coalition argued,
would be to educate consumers, improve doctor-patient dialogue
and identify previously undiagnosed illnesses.4 Their efforts were
challenged and eventually defeated by an opposing coalition, made
up of actors concerned by evidence that DTCA-PD ‘medicalizes’
non-essential health issues and increases demand for drugs,5–7 as
well as suggestions that ‘targeting of patients may be a prime
objective’ of industry actors.8 The legislative proposal to weaken
the DTCA-PD ban was withdrawn by the European Commission
in 2014, having failed to gain agreement among EU policy-makers,
and the debate has since shifted to one of ‘health literacy’ and
broader information provision.3
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Coalitions, control and the role of ideas
The ACF understands change in public policy to be the result of
interaction and competition between coalitions of actors within a
particular policy area.2 These coalitions are made up of a broad
range of interests and organizations from across local, national,
regional and international levels of government, business and civil
society groups, as well as journalists, researchers and policy analysts.9
In this way, the ACF has much in common with the literature on
policy networks (see Lo¨blova´, this issue, and [2]) and epistemic
communities10 in challenging the notion that policy, practitioner
and research communities are distinct and internally
homogenous.11 Mapping the actors involved in DTCA-PD policy
from a coalitions perspective draws attention to contrasting
positions held by different parts of the European Commission—
the pro-DTCA leadership of Enterprise Commissioner, Erkki
Liikanen, and the resistance of the Health Directorate, DG
SANCO (now DG Sante´)—and, perhaps less obviously, the
disunity within civil society, between independent NGOs like
Health Action International and their pharma-funded counterparts,
such as the European Patients’ Forum.5,12 It also highlights the
crucial roles played by actors such as EU journalist, Rory Watson,
who published ongoing coverage in the British Medical Journal, co-
director of Social Audit Ltd, Charles Medawar, who provided
specialist policy analysis and academics such as Professor John
Abraham, whose research on DTCA-PD was widely cited in the
political debate. The ACF’s prioritization of ‘ideas’ is important
here. Traditional, linear conceptions of policy-making assume an
ordered process where evidence is considered at particular points
and coordinated by a decision-making authority.13 However, as the
ACF acknowledges, policy-making is no longer the purview of a
closed group of individuals or institutions. Rather, ‘. . . actors may
be influential because they articulate important ideas, not simply
because they can exercise power’.2 Strong coalitions should
therefore include a wide spectrum of actors, including those which
may not have experience in political engagement.
The traditional policy-making institutions remain important. ‘In any
intergovernmental system . . . different coalitions may be in control of
various governmental units’ and a core objective of any coalition is ‘to
. . . manipulate the assignment of program responsibilities so that the
governmental units that it controls have the most authority’.14 Success,
in this case, means ‘controlling’ crucial actors and positions. For
example, the pro-DTCA coalition benefitted from influence over the
Rapporteur in the relevant Parliament Committee, MEP Christopher
Fjellner, who was committed to expanding the Swedish regulatory
model, which permits industry communication with patients.15 The
pro-DTCA coalition also ‘had control of’ the industry and enterprise
directorate, DG ENTR.
The greater success was enjoyed, however, by the anti-DTCA
coalition. In 2009 the pharmaceutical portfolio was reassigned
from DG ENTR, where it had resided when the challenge to the
DTCA-PD ban was launched, to DG SANCO, where it has
remained (despite subsequent challenges) since. This reassignment
was not an explicit element of the anti-DTCA coalition strategy,
since DG SANCO’s weakness made it unlikely,16 but rather was an
outcome of internal European Commission politics. DG ENTR was
seen as unable to provide leadership in the H1N1 crisis; moreover,
relocation would bring the Commission’s structure for pharmaceut-
icals in line with that of most member states.17 The ACF might
define this shift as an ‘external system event’ or a change in a
‘long-term coalition opportunity structure’, both referring to
features outside of the pharmaceutical policy sphere and the
control of its actors. However, this sits uneasily with the reality
that, in other circumstances, reassignment might have been a
strong strategic objective for the anti-DTCA coalition and one
which it might have had power to influence. Moreover, whilst the
ACF recognizes the importance of ‘control’ of governmental units, it
is less clear on how this interacts with other features of the system—
changes in government, public opinion, etc.—as more recent
literature acknowledges.18
Belief systems and the role of technical
information
In addition to challenging the structure of traditional, linear policy-
making models, the ACF also challenges their logic. Refuting the
notion that ‘healthy policy’ is the result of rational consideration
of the evidence by committed political actors, the ACF holds that
actors ‘. . . engage in politics to translate their beliefs, rather than
their simple material interests, into action’.2 Since organizational
and commercial interests are understood as beliefs, and beliefs can
only be revised in particular, political circumstances, the ACF holds
that evidence is a political tool that is unlikely to be used neutrally.19
This might sit uneasily in a sector where industry involvement in
policy-making is more commonly understood as a conflict of interest
than a divergence of beliefs but the ACF offers a valuable view on what
role evidence can hope to play in changing the position of commercial
actors and decision makers. It identifies three categories of belief.14
The first is ‘deep (normative) core’ beliefs, which can be thought of as
an actor’s underlying personal philosophy, illustrated by their view on
the relative value of freedom, power, health and knowledge, for
instance. Pharmaceutical industry actors value ‘open markets, free
enterprise and unrestrained exchange of information’,4 whilst patient
organizations regard individual health and its protection as more
important—this is a conflict in deep core beliefs. The second
category of belief is the ‘near (policy) core’ belief, concerning issues
like the appropriate balance between market and state activity and the
desirability of participation in the policy process by experts. These are
linked to the realization of deep core values in a particular policy
sector. In extolling its value as a source of information about its
medicines (a near core belief), the industry sought to realize its deep
core commitment to freedom of information provision. Finally, there
are ‘secondary’ beliefs. These resemble practical decisions about how
to implement near core beliefs in a given policy issue, by establishing
appropriate budgetary allocations and administrative procedures.14
Since change in deep core beliefs is ‘akin to religious conversion’14
and near core beliefs are unlikely to change within a single legislative
cycle, secondary beliefs—those about the ‘routine delivery of specific
policies’—are the most susceptible to change.2 This makes clear why
health advocates struggled to change the views of their opponents in
the DTCA-PD debate, and suggests that the pro-DTCA coalition was
right to target incremental change in policy delivery, such as pilot
projects to provide information on medicines for a specific list of
diseases or a reframing of the debate to discuss ‘health literacy’.3
However, the ACF is less clear about how the profit-making interests
of commercial actors should be understood. Its founding authors, in
fact, are divided as to whether profit-making is the embodiment of a
relatively fixed near-core belief—meaning that it will be difficult to
convince the pharmaceutical industry that it should give up its entitle-
ment to pursue profit by advertising its medicines—or a motive that
means commercial actors are liable to change coalitions and beliefs
frequently.13,20 This is an important weakness of the ACF and one
which calls for further empirical investigation.
In addition to explaining actor behaviour, the ACF identifies a
number of principles which govern the role of scientific information
in the policy-making process. Here again, the ACF has much in
common with the more recent literature on evidence in policy.21
The generation or gathering of evidence is prompted by a
perceived threat or opportunity. For example, having noted the
relaxing of DTCA-PD rules in the United States in the late 1900s,
the pro-DTCA Transatlantic Business Alliance (TBA) quickly
published a report listing the potential benefits of similar deregula-
tion in the EU, pushing the issue onto the agenda (TBA quoted in
[5,22]) Once the coalitions have adopted their positions, however,
evidence is primarily used for advocacy purposes.9 The strategic
12 European Journal of Public Health
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value of scientific information is more important than the evidence
it contains and partisan application is more common than apolitical
consideration, even where knowledge is ‘co-produced’.23 The real
value of the pro-DTCA coalition’s provision, inserted into
Directive 2004/27/EC (Article 88a) and requiring a report on
current DTCA practice within three years, was its role in ensuring
that the issue would return to the agenda. The debate was reignited
in 2007 and numerous consultations and studies quickly followed to
support the position that ‘patient information’ was a topic requiring
legislative action.12 Though only 7% of healthcare organizations,
11% of regulators and 0% of consumer and social insurance
organizations responded positively to the idea of industry
providing information to patients in a 2008 consultation,24 a
proposal to this end was published nonetheless.25 In addition to
supporting the ACF’s assumption that coalitions ‘. . . will resist in-
formation suggesting that their basic beliefs may be invalid or un-
attainable’,14 this is line with the broader literature on scientific
information in policy and the conclusion that even evidence
designed to inform policy-makers, like consultations, has primarily
symbolic value as a ‘marker of good decision making’.26
The role of learning in policy change
How then, in light of these features of the policy-making system, can
PHPs hope to change policy? Since major policy change would
require a shift in near core, and possibly even deep core, beliefs,
this can only be brought about by an external event.14 For
example, the election of a new government which favours DTCA-
PD, or a health crisis linked to a lack of patient awareness about how
a particular drug acts, could shift the balance of power. Here the
ACF might offer some explanation of the failure of the pro-DTCA
coalition to secure abolition of the EU ban. Whilst industry actors
sought to harness the momentum from U.S. deregulation, this was
not a significant enough shift in the external environment to
undermine the EU’s commitment to consumer protection outright.
Thus, while coalitions must be ready to exploit such external events,
minor policy change is perhaps a more predictable pursuit and a more
achievable goal. The pro-DTCA coalition realized this early in the
debate and sought to alter minor provisions of the EU regulation
by adding amendments that allowed information provision in
prescribed circumstances, such as for medicines to treat HIV/AIDS,
asthma and diabetes.12 Similarly, the proposed Directive maintained
the ban but allowed provision of ‘certain information’, understood to
include that from scientific studies.12 Both of these attempts failed,
but the role of learning in policy change, as understood by the ACF,
facilitates a more nuanced analysis of the coalition’s strategy.
The early ACF literature identified learning as the key to minor
policy change.14 Learning, where coalitions change their secondary
beliefs in response to new information, has a specific meaning
here.27 It is a political activity, where information and evidence
are processed through the lens of deep held beliefs and often
utilized for advocacy purposes, as explored above.2 As such,
genuine learning will only take place in certain circumstances and
its likelihood is determined by the degree of conflict between
coalitions and the analytical tractability of the issue.9 The latter
was less prominent in the DTCA-PD case—though the methodo-
logical rigour of many DTCA-PD studies is contested28—but can
prove crucial in other areas of public health, such as calculations of
alcohol-related harm in the minimum unit pricing debate, for
instance. Where direct causality is difficult to assert and appropriate
data sources and measurements cannot be agreed, coherent
exchanges become difficult and the potential for learning is limited.
The greater the degree of conflict between coalitions, translating to
the ‘depth’ of the disputed beliefs, the more information is produced
and publicized, but the less receptive opposing actors become. On the
surface, the DTCA-PD debate was about whether it is appropriate for
the pharmaceutical industry to provide information about their
products directly to consumers and how such provision should be
regulated. At its core, however, was a conflict about the value of
business and its promotion, relative to the value of consumer and
health protection. DG ENTR, then, was unlikely to alter its view in
response to evidence that DTCA-PD is designed to increase pharma-
ceutical sales29,30 and health advocates were unlikely to be moved by
testimony of its virtues for informed choice.31,32 As such, the pro-DTCA
coalition adopted the right strategy in seeking incremental change to the
existing ban and, though the intensity of conflict meant that these efforts
ultimately failed, some evidence of learning can be seen in the adoption
of amendments (Directive 2004/27/EC Article 88a) and Council con-
clusions33 which called for ‘further reflection’ on the issue and the pub-
lication of more reports which would sustain attention.
Conclusion
The ACF does not offer comprehensive explanation of the DTCA-
PD debate in the EU but provides a valuable framework through
which to analyze the strategies invoked by those involved. Moreover,
by setting out some basic assumptions about the potential for
learning between actors and the likely impact of scientific informa-
tion, it makes clear the parameters and conditions of successful
advocacy and policy influence. This concluding section identifies
three key implications for PHPs and researchers.
(1) Health actors must form broad coalitions and prepare to
maintain involvement for a long time. Seek out non-traditional
actors—journalists, researchers and those with less formal
avenues of influence—as well as groups which are not yet
mobilized but might be affected by the policy problem in
future.34 Maintain these connections for the long run. Though
‘quick wins’ are appealing, processes of knowledge accumula-
tion, learning and policy change take time and, as such, actors
seeking influence should be prepared to engage in the policy
cycle for a decade or more.35
(2) Coalitions should be aware of belief systems and how they
impact upon learning. Viewing policy debates through the
lens of belief systems not only helps with the dissection and
understanding of different views, but also enables clear articu-
lation of one’s own views to others.35 Moreover, in being
realistic about the chances of changing an opposing coalition’s
position, an advocate is able to better frame and direct their
expertise. As Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier9 warn,
. . . it is in analytical debates characterized by high levels of
conflict, over analytically intractable issues, and in open fora
that analysis is most likely to be employed primarily as a
political resource. Practitioners who expect their analysis to
have an independent and influential role in shaping policy in
contexts of this sort are likely to be met with disappointment.
(3) Researchers must respond to calls for pluralistic and collabora-
tive approaches to knowledge production at the intersection of
public health and political science,36,37 particularly as concerns
the policy-making process.38 This requires action on two fronts.
PHPs and public health researchers should make use of the
public policy and administration literature to move beyond
linear conceptions of policy-making and acknowledge the
difference between evidence-based medicine and evidence-
based policy.23 Political science researchers, meanwhile, need
to reflect upon the dilemmas that policy theory can present
for PHPs, particularly assertions that influence requires
persuasion and that hierarchies of evidence are not relevant
for policy-making, which challenge core public health norms.23
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Key points
 The Advocacy Coalition Framework is one of several tools
from political science which can help public health practi-
tioners to engage with the policy process.
 Successful engagement requires identification of a broad and
multi-disciplinary coalition of actors and a clear under-
standing of how beliefs shape learning and policy change
 Contrary to the dominant model of politics, scientific infor-
mation is rarely considered apolitically—more commonly, it
is used for advocacy purposes in support of a coalitions
objectives.
 Political science research has great relevance for public
health. Both practitioners and researchers should strive to
ensure that synergies are exploited and knowledge is co-
produced for maximum benefit.
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